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-NOTES AND COMMENTS
the act that this additional duty was laid for the purpose of enabling
Congress to regulate by taxes the intrastate liquor traffic, a power which
was withdrawn by the Twenty-first Amendment.
THroMAs H. LEATii.
Contracts-Adoption of Present and Future Laws therein.
In a mortgage the mortgagor declared "his assent to the passing of a
decree by the Circuit Court of Baltimore City . . . for a sale of the
property herein mortgaged in accordance with sections 720 to 723
inclusive of chapter 123 of the laws of Maryland passed at the January
session of 1898, or any amendments or additions thereto".' The mort-
gagee assigned to the plaintiff part of the mortgage debt, but less than a
one-fourth interest therein. Thereafter the legislature passed section
720A, 2 amending section 720 to the effect that during the emergency
period holders of less than a one-fourth interest in mortgage debts should
not have recourse to the summary remedies given under section 720.
Upon subsequent default by the mortgagor, the plaintiff petitioned for
relief under section 720, alleging that section 720A was unconstitu-
tional, as impairing his contract rights and violating the equal protec-
tion clause. The judgment of the trial court, upholding both contentions
of the plaintiff, was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals on the
basis of impairment of contract only. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, judgment was reversed on the theory that the
amendment did not impair the plaintiff's contract rights.8
The Maryland Court of Appeals took the position that assent of the
mortgagor to a decree as provided by section 720 "or any amendments
or additions thereto", did not amount to an agreement that the proceed-
ings should be governed by "future amendments effective before appli-
cation for the decree", but that the intention of the parties "embraced
only such amendments as had been made prior to the execution of the
mortgage". After quoting that argument, Justice McReynolds, for the
United States Supreme court, said, "Prior to the mortgage there had
been no such amendments, and it cannot be correctly said that the 'inten-
tion of the parties embraced only such amendments as had been made
prior to the execution of the mortgage'. On the contrary the words
844 (S. D. Ga. 1935) hold directly that the statute is a regulatory measure and
unconstitutional.
I Md. Laws 1898, c. 123, §720 (providing that where the mortgagor declared
his assent to such decree, upon the petition of the mortgagee or his assigns to
the named court, that court could issue such decree of sale and prescribe terms
for same).
'Md. Laws 1933, c. 56, §1.
' United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 168,
79 L. Ed. 191 (1934).
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employed seem to us to embrace the amendments and additions there-
after made".
Problems connected with relief legislation, which this case suggests,
have been adequately discussed elsewhere.4 The scope of this note will
be confined to the examination of questions raised by the express adop-
tion into the mortgage contract of an existing statute and "any amend-
ments or additions thereto".
As to law in existence when the contract is made, the familiar rules
may be briefly summarized. When the parties do not refer to it: (a)
All valid law applicable becomes a part of the contract ;5 (b) but that
is not true of unconstitutional law, even if such law specifically recites
that it is a part of contracts 6 to whidh it is made applicable. When the
parties do refer to it: (a) Express inclusion of valid law is unneces-
sary, since it applies anyway ;7 but express adoption of unconstitutional
law makes it a part of the contract, unless it was written therein merely
in compliance with mandatory provisions of the law, or unless it is
unenforceable because contrary to public policy.8  (b) An express
exclusion of valid law is of no effect if the attempt is to exclude sub-
stantive rules of contract,9 such as those relative to consideration; but
if the attempt is to exclude only laws of a non-mandatory nature, such
as procedural requirements, the intention of the parties will be given
effect.' 0 (c) Without going into the implications connected with Con-
flicts of Laws, it is pertinent to mention here the doctrine that parties
may successfully stipulate that their rights are to be governed by the
substantive law of another state or nation, unless their purpose is evasion
of their own state's laws."x
However, as to law enacted after the execution of the contract, some
"On Retroactivity and Mortgage Relief Legislation, see: Notes (1934) 47
HARV. L. REV. 299 and 661; (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 830; (1934) 32 MIcE. L.
REV. 545; (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 363; (1934) 20 VA. L. REV. 122.
'Hood ex rel Bank of Summerfield v. Simpson, 206 N. C. 748, 175 S. E. 193
(1934); Knight v. Clinkscales, 51 Okla. 508, 152 Pac. 133 (1915); Lunati v.
Progressive Bld. and Loan Assoc., 167 Tenn. 161, 67 S. W. (2nd) 148 (1934).
'People v. Choler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716 (1901); Palmer v. Tingle, 55
Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313 (1896).
Cases cited supra, note (5).
'People v. Choler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716 (1901); See: Palmer v. Tingle,
55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313 (1896) ; City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Con-
struction Co., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N. E. 885 (1902).
o See: Miller v. Thompson, 40 Nev. 35, 160 Pac. 775 (1916) ; Specht v. Collins,
81 Tex. 213, 16 S. W. 934 (1891) ; (both cases holding that an attempt to exclude
from a contract legal impossibility imposed by the law of the state was ineffective)
4 PAGE, CoNTPAcrs (2nd ed. 1920) §2049.
" Symser v. Fair, 73 Kan. 773, 85 Pac. 408 (1906) (allowing waiver of notice
otherwise required by law) ; William Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601,
252 N. W. 650 (1934).
'
1Clark v. Gibbs, 69 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Castleman v. Canal
Bank and Trust Co., - Miss. -, 156 So. 648 (1934).
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difficulty is encountered. When the parties do not refer to such law in
their agreement, ordinarily the rule is that only remedial measures be-
come a part of their contract, 12 but that substantive enactments will not
operate retroactively to impair vested rights,' 3 apart from a valid exer-
cise of the police power.' 4 But when there is an expression of mutual
assent by the parties to the adoption into the contract of an existing
statute and all amendments and additions thereto, there arises a problem
of construction relative to three specific fact situations:
First, there is the situation wherein amendments exist at the time of
the making of the contract, but no further ones are enacted before the
suit. Here, obviously the amendments form part of the contract, regard-
less of the express adoption, because they were valid law when the con-
tract was made.15
Second, there is the situation wherein there are amendments existing
at the time of making the contract, and also new amendments passed
before the suit. Here, if it appeared that the parties knew or thought
amendments existed at the time of entering the agreement, it would
logically appear that their intention was to include only such additions,
since to include the new ones also would make their contractual rights
uncertain.' 6 It is submitted that in this situation the intention of the
parties should be given effect, and the application of the new amend-
ments excluded, in spite of the fact that their expression of incorpora-
tion is literally broad enough to cover the new statutes. This contention
is based on the rule that though ordinarily contractual rights are deter-
mined strictly by expressions of agreement,17 still, when the expressions
of agreement differ from the agreements intended by the' parties, courts
will often accept the interpretation of the parties, or rescind the con-
tract.'8
Third, there is the case in which there are no amendments in exis-
" Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U. S. 314, 21 L. ed. 357 (1872) ; Strand v. Griffith,
63 Wash. 334, 115 Pac. 512 (1911); See: 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§1693.
'Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042, 41 L. ed. 93 (1895);
Hard v. State ex rel Baker, - Ala. -, 154 So. 77 (1934); See: 2 LEwis AND
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2nd ed. 1904) §660; 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES(8th ed. 1928) §1694.
1" See note (4) supra on Relief Legislation.
' Cases cited supra note (5).
" In reaching the result of the instant case, the court, by stressing the point
that "prior to the mortgage there had been no such amendments", indicates by
inference agreement with the contention made in the -text.
'Robinson v. Bowe, 73 F. (2d) 238 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Birk v. Jackson,
- Tex. Civ. App. -, 75 S. W. (2d) 918 (1934).
"Morgan v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 746 (Ct Cl. 1934); Cage v. Black,
97 Ark. 613, 134 S. W. 942 (1911) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167
Tenn. 421, 70 S. W. (2d) 361 (1934); See: 3 WILISToN, CONTRACTS (1922)§1541.
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tence when the contract is executed but amendments are enacted before
the bringing of the action. Here there are three possibilities: (1) If
from the circumstances, as unusual particularity of language in the
contract, it appeared that the parties knew there were no amendments
existing when they entered the agreement, it would seem that they did
intend to embrace the amendments enacted thereafter, since that would
be the only meaning of the language including amendments.' 9 (2) But
if there were not convincing indications of such knowledge, it would
seem that their intention was not to include future additions to the
statute, but only additions they thought might exist when the contract
was made, for the same reason as given in the second situation.20 (3)
But even if the parties knew there were no amendments to the statute
when the agreement was made, still if the future additions were so
sweeping as completely to change their agreement or work forfeitures, it
could not logically be said that they intended such amendment to be a
part of their contract, because it is not normal for parties to include in
their agreements such chances of losing rights for which they bar-
gained. 21 Here again it is believed that the intention of the parties should
be given effect, so as to exclude the operation upon their contract of the
future statutes, both for the reason given in the second situation, and also
because the courts prefer a construction that makes the contract fair
and avoids a forfeiture.22
In both the second and third situations, it is conceivable that for some
reason, such as opposite beliefs as to the existence of amendments at
the time of making the contract, one party might intend future additions
to apply to the contract, while the other party did not so intend. In
this case, aside from possible questions involving misrepresentation
resulting in erroneous belief as to the existence of amendments, or negli-
gence of parties in signing express agreements, it is thought that the
clause purporting to adopt amendments, in so far as future additions
are concerned, should be without effect, because of misunderstanding.23
J. L. CARLTON.
It seems that the principal case belongs in this category; and hence that it
properly represents one of the rare situations in which such expressions are
reliable indications of the intent of the parties to make future statutes a part
of their contract.
' See material cited supra, notes 16 and 18.
'For primary rules of interpretation, see: 2 WnsLISrON, CONTRACTS (1922)
§618 ("The writing will be read as a whole; and if possible it will be construed
so as to give effect to its general purpose").
Conway Co. v. Chicago, 274 Ill. 369, 113 N. E. 703 (1916) ; Flieschman v.
Furgeson, 223 N. Y. 235, 119 N. E. 400 (1918) ; Dumphrey v. Commercial UniQn
Assur. Co., 107 Tex. 107, 174 S. W. 814 (1915).
'Peerless Co. v. Pacific Crockery Co., 121 Cal. 641, 54 Pac. 101 (1898);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S. W. (2d) 361
(1934) ; Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906 (Exch. 1864) ; See: 1 WMLrsToN,
CoNTRACTs (1922) §95.
